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1.  Introduction 
RFID technology raises a number of security and privacy concerns, which may substantially 
limit its deployment and reduce potential benefits. Public consultations led by the European 
Commission with citizens, RFID manufacturers, system integrators, academic institutions 
and public bodies confirm that privacy and security is a major concern 
(www.rfidconsultation.eu). Features which make RFID especially vulnerable among 
information systems are:  
1. Wireless transmission between tag and reader:  
Most of the attacks on RFID systems described in the next part of this chapter exploit 
the air interface. 
2. The limited resources of the tag:  
The low power supply and small memory of low-cost passive tags limit the extent to 
which security measures can be applied.  
3. The small size of tags:  
RFID tags can be almost invisible,1 which allows them to be attached to items carried by 
people without their consent or even their knowledge.  
The most common threat is unauthorised access to the data stored on the tag or sent via the 
air interface. Attackers can achieve this either by reading the tag with an unauthorized 
reader (rogue scanning) or by eavesdropping on a legitimate communication. Access to the 
data on the tag is a threat in itself, but it can also be the first step to other types of attack. For 
example, in a replay attack, the attacker repeats the authentication sequence captured when 
it was emitted by an authorized tag, and in this way he may usurp the identity of another 
person. The attacker can also make a duplicate of the tag, with has the same functionality. 
Another threat is the malicious modification of the memory content of the RFID tag, with a view 
to changing attributes reported by the tag or using the tag as a carrier of malware. Denial of 
service can be avoided by blocking (putting the anti-collision protocol in a practically infinite 
loop) and frequency jamming. By reverse engineering and side channel attack, the attacker may 
discover algorithms and data on the tag (including the cryptographic key). Moreover, 
                                                 
1 The smallest passive tags commercially available in 2006 are of size 0.15×0.15×0.0075 mm 
(Harrop et al. 2008).   O
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Source: Development and Implementation of RFID Technology, Book edited by: Cristina TURCU,  
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protection measures for RFID-based cards are more difficult to apply than for contact cards. 
Finally, RFID systems may be the subject of attack to backend, like any other information 
system.  
Depending on the application in which an RFID system is commercialized, security and 
privacy threats should be differently treated. Some applications demand high levels of 
security (like access control systems) and privacy (like e-documents), while for others, like 
livestock tracking or some manufacturing processes, these concerns are less important. Also, 
types of risk depend on the application. For presentation in this chapter, we have selected 
the set of application areas where the most relevant privacy and security issues arise. 
(However, where the same issues appear in different applications, we have not tried to 
discuss all of them.)  We have looked especially at those applications which are large in 
economic terms and involve a large number of users. Detailed criteria are presented at the 
beginning of Section 3. The four selected application areas are: item-level tagging, electronic 
ID documents, contactless smart card and RFID implants.  
Item-level tagging is foreseen to be the main RFID application in terms of market value and 
number of tags, and the most pervasive one. The main privacy concern here is unauthorized 
tag reading. When tagging at item level becomes common, if appropriate countermeasures 
are not applied, attackers will be able to find out what items a person has in a bag (e.g. what 
type of medicine), the price and brand of clothes, etc. A set of tags attached to items usually 
carried by a person may allow his identification and tracking. There are many 
countermeasures, which can reduce and even eliminate the risk, but just the possibility of 
massive invasions of privacy and a “big brother” scenario has an important impact on 
image of RFID and its social acceptance. 
Electronic identity documents may use different technologies. Nevertheless, for electronic 
passports, RFID has been selected, as it is more appropriate for the booklet form of e-
passports than, for example, contact smart cards.  The combination of two privacy-sensitive 
technologies – i.e. RFID and biometrics – brings particular concerns about privacy. The main 
threats are: secret reading of personal data and biometrics, copying the passport, tracking 
the passport’s owner, and theoretically even the construction of a bomb which could be 
triggered by a passport of a specific nation or individual. Though several security measures 
have been proposed in the ICAO specification (Basic Access Control, Active Authentication, 
and Extended Access Control) there is ongoing discussion as to whether the protection they 
offer is sufficient. 
Contactless smart cards and single-use RFID-based tickets increase convenience and 
efficiency in public transport and allow additional services to be offered. They provide 
detailed information about traffic patterns which can be used in traffic management 
(schedule optimisation) and enable new payment plans, like fee per kilometre. Apart from 
security risks typical to each RFID application based on wearable tokens, privacy is a special 
issue for public transport applications, since travel patterns of individuals can be recorded 
and stored in a central database.  
RFID implants for identification and authentication of people are probably the most 
controversial among RFID technologies. They provide a permanent and physical link between 
the person and the tag. The first implant was approved for commercial use by the FDA in 
2004. Since then, about two thousand people were injected with tags, mostly in order to be 
included in a healthcare information system. This system provides online access to medical 
record of a patient based on ID number communicated by the implant. In the future RFID 
implants may have a wide range of applications. However, privacy and security issues, as well 
as possible health risks, may limit or even stop further deployment of this technology. 
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Our purpose was not to give a complete discussion of all applications where privacy and 
security is important, which would be rather repetitive. Instead, we provided four 
examples, which cover the most of issues. Threats and measures in, for example, access 
control systems or electronic payment will be similar to those which are discussed here.  
In this chapter, we focus mostly on the technical aspects of security and privacy and the 
technical countermeasures, but there are also legal, social and economic challenges related to 
security issues. Moreover it is important to bear in mind that security and privacy protection 
need to be followed by the creation of user trust and awareness. Even a secure system will not 
be successful if the user’s perception of security and privacy protection is low. 
This chapter is structured as follows: in Section 2, we present in more detail the threats 
mentioned above and corresponding countermeasures. In Section 3, we discuss selected 
applications.  We provide a summary and conclusions in Section 4.  
2. Threats to RFID systems – state of the art 
In this section, we present the threats to RFID and corresponding countermeasures – see Fig. 
1. We focus on those risks which are not an issue in other information systems. We do not  
 
 
Fig. 1. Threats to RFID systems and number of subchapters where they are discussed 
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discuss attacks on the backend of the RFID system, which are similar to attacks on non-RFID 
information systems. Exhaustive information about risks and countermeasures in 
information systems can be found in, for example (Hansche et al., 2004). 
It is interesting to observe that one type of attack may be a preparatory step for another one. 
For example, eavesdropping may enable cloning of the tag; this may then result in a replay 
attack and the final consequence may be unauthorized access to a restricted area. These 
kinds of relations imply that a single vulnerability of the system, even if it is not perceived 
as a problem in itself, may threaten security and privacy in areas which are not directly 
related to it. 
2.1 Rogue scanning 
A fake reader can be used for unauthorized reading of information from a tag. The range of 
a reader may be extended several times beyond the standard communication distance. For 
example for standard ISO 14443, used in proximity cards like MIFARE and in electronic 
passports, the standard communication range is 10 cm. Kirschenbaum & Wool (2006) built a 
“home-made” reader able to operate from 25 cm at a cost of $100. Further extension of the 
range up to about 35 cm is possible, probably at a similar cost. Fortunately, range increase is 
not only a matter of reader parameters. Simulations led by Kfir & Wool (2005) show that ISO 
14443 cards can be read from maximum distance of 55 cm in the worst-case scenario, where 
there is only man-made noise and sophisticated signal processing by the attacker. For larger 
distances, it is not possible to separate the signal from the noise. However, even 25 cm is 
enough to read a card in someone’s pocket.  
Using short-range tags wherever possible makes rogue scanning more difficult. Shielding with 
an anti-skimming material (e.g. aluminium foil) when the tag is not in use, protects it from 
scanning. A specific and common countermeasure against unauthorized tag reading is the 
authentication of the reader. Risk can also be reduced by moving sensitive information to a 
protected database in the system’s backend. In this case, in order to retrieve information based 
on an ID number read from the tag, the user must authenticate himself to access the backend 
part of the system, where authentication methods are not limited by the constraints of RFID 
technology. However, it should be noted that keeping personal data in a central database is 
generally perceived as more privacy invasive than when they are kept only on tokens 
owned by users. Moreover, although the back office can include stronger security than RFID 
tags, there is always some risk of compromising all the records in one attack. Other concerns 
related to central vs. local storage are discussed in Section 5.1 of the report (Snijder 2007). 
Another countermeasure against rogue scanning is to let the tag send information only 
when it is activated by the user (e.g. by pressing a button), thus the possibility of unauthorized 
reading is limited to moments when a legitimate communication is demanded. This solution 
is appropriate for active tags, like car remotes, where the communication can be initiated by 
the tag. However, for most low-cost passive tags or smart cards, this solution is not 
practical. Also, in many applications, the full automation of the process is RFID’s main asset. 
Many privacy concerns can be avoided by permanent deactivation of tags which are not going 
to be used any more. This possibility has been foreseen in the EPC Global standard and will 
probably become common with the massive deployment of RFID in retail.  
2.2 Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping on a legitimate communication is a secret monitoring of data sent via the air 
interface between an RFID tag and a reader. The attacker does not need to power the tag, 
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which is already powered by a legitimate reader. Because of this, the maximum range for 
eavesdropping may be significantly larger (for the same type of tag) than for rogue 
scanning. Eavesdropping is a passive action – the attacker does not emit any signal – and is 
therefore very difficult to detect.  
The most common countermeasure is encryption of data transmitted between tag and 
reader, so the signal can still be eavesdropped but not understood. There are, however, 
several challenges. As we mentioned in the introduction, RFID tags have limited resources. 
In low-cost passive tags, the total number of gates is about 500-5,000 (Weis, et al., 2004) and 
not more than half of them can be dedicated to security.2 Realization of advanced 
cryptographic algorithms requires from several thousand to about 25 thousand gates. Small 
amount of power that can be harvested by a tag antenna is also a limitation for processing 
data. Another issue is related to protection and administration of keys. If symmetric 
cryptography is applied, all tags and readers share the same secret, and there is a risk that it 
can be retrieved from any tag. Tags are generally not tamper-resistant and even if a 
cryptographic algorithm is well defined and does not allow an attacker to obtain the key 
from a communication, there is a risk that the key will be revealed by spying into the 
manufacturer’s documentation, reverse engineering (of tag or reader) or by a side-channel 
attack. Advanced asymmetric cryptography algorithms are often too heavy for RFID, and 
neither are they free from problems with key management. Another possible 
countermeasure is shielding the tag and reader during information exchange. However, this 
is rarely applied, as it is not very practical. It is also important to use the standard with the 
smallest communication range sufficient for a given application. 
2.3 Relay attack 
Relay attack is a type of man-in-the-middle attack (Kfir & Wool 2005), where the attacker 
creates a connection between a legitimate reader and the victim’s legitimate tag, as shown in 
Fig. 2. From the point of view of the RFID system, the communication looks as if the 
legitimate tag and the reader are close to each other when, in fact, they are communicating 
through the communication channel, usually wireless, established by the attacker. In this 
way, the attacker may authenticate himself in an access control system or a payment system. 
The maximum distance between a legitimate tag and an attacker’s reader (called sometimes 
a “leech”) is the same as in the case of rogue scanning, but the distance between a legitimate 
reader and an attacker’s device which simulates a legitimate tag (“ghost”) is much longer – 
up to 50 m. A successful relay attack against an RFID system complying with the ISO 
14443A standard has been proven to be feasible (Hancke 2005). 
Since the attacker only re-transmits information, without the need to understand it, the 
authentication protocol (e.g. challenge-response) does not protect against this kind of attack. 
This threat can be countered by using short range tags and by shielding tags (e.g. by keeping 
them in bags containing aluminium foil, when not in use). There is also a specific 
countermeasure against relay attack – distance bounding protocol – which estimates the 
distance between the reader and the tag, based either on response time (Hancke & Kuhn, 
2005; Reid et al., 2006) or signal-to-noise rate (Fishkin & Roy, 2003). 
                                                 
2 The number of gates in tag increases from year to year but still memory and power 
harvested by the antenna are strong limitations to the security on the tag side. In most 
applications the manufacturers focus rather on reduction of tag costs than increasing 
memory size. 
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                             a                                                                                    b 
Fig. 2. A legitimate communication (a) and relay attack (b). Maximum ranges refer to ISO 
14443 and are based on theoretical results received by Kfir & Wool (2005) 
2.4 Cloning the tag 
‘Cloning’ means making a duplicate of an RFID tag. A clone may be similar in form to the 
original or be a larger device with the same functionality. Duplicates can be used to access a 
restricted area, abuse private data or make an electronic transaction on behalf of a victim. 
Cloning can be prevented by the use of cryptographic methods for authentication of the tag. 
If a challenge-response protocol is used, information which can be obtained by the attacker 
using the air interface (e.g. by eavesdropping) is not sufficient to duplicate the tag. Although 
reverse engineering, in theory, may allow duplication of any electronic circuit, these 
methods require special equipment and a very high level of knowledge. Moreover, there are 
countermeasures which can be applied at the circuit manufacturing stage. 
Authentication of the tag should be based on well established cryptographic algorithms, 
which are constantly analysed by researchers. Although their security has not been 
mathematically proved, it can be assumed that their vulnerabilities are well known. The use 
of proprietary methods, where security is supposed to be based on secrecy of the algorithm, 
is generally not recommended. There are at least several examples where RFID 
authentication protocols, developed in laboratories of big companies, have been cracked.  
The best known cases are the cracking of Digital Signature Transponder (Texas Instruments) 
and of MiFare (Philips), described in Section 3.3. On the other side, looking at almost twenty 
years of contact smart card history, we cannot agree with popular opinion that security 
should be based only on the secrecy of the key. Especially when it comes to chip design, 
public chip schemes would make it much easier to retrieve the key directly from the circuit 
and therefore manufacturers make a considerable effort to hide the structure and mislead 
those who try to discover it (see section on reverse engineering). 
Another frequent reason for security gaps (in the two cases mentioned and many others) is 
too short encryption keys. Short keys mean lower power consumption and lower cost, so 
manufacturers try to use the shortest keys which, at the moment, seem safe. However, the 
lifetime of a solution like this is often longer than foreseen and, due to progress in 
technology, the size of the key is no longer sufficient. Unfortunately, when the system is 
already deployed on a large scale (like DTA and MiFare), the cost of security updates is 
enormous.  
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2.5 Tracking of people 
Tracking of people takes place when an attacker follows the movements of individuals 
through the RFID tags they carry with them. Tracking can be performed with rogue readers 
placed, for example, in doors, or by the deployment of eavesdropping devices in the 
proximity of legitimate readers. 
Many countermeasures to reduce the risk of tracking have already been mentioned, like 
using short range tags, shielding them, authentication of readers and disabling tags when 
not used. However, we can foresee that, in the future, people will carry many RFID tags 
with them and therefore a personal device which controls access to them, possibly 
integrated in their mobile phones or PDAs, may be very useful – like the one proposed by 
Rieback et al.  (2005). There are also countermeasures which can be implemented at tag-
design stage, such as: pseudonyms (changing identifiers) or estimation of distance from the 
reader (Garfinkel et al. 2005). 
2.6 Replay attack 
In the case of replay attack, the attacker abuses another person's identity by repeating the 
same authentication sequence as the one provided by an authorized person. A replay attack 
may be led by a clone of the legitimate tag or by re-sending the eavesdropped signal from a 
PC equipped with an appropriate card and antenna.  
In order to perform a replay attack, an attacker has to obtain some information which is sent 
by the tag during normal communication. The first line of defence is therefore to counter 
eavesdropping and unauthorized tag reading. A specific countermeasure against replay 
attack is authentication of the tag e.g. with a challenge-response protocol. If the protocol is 
well designed, the key necessary for calculation of response cannot be deduced from 
information exchanged through the air interface. 
2.7 Malicious change of the tag content 
As a result of malicious change of the tag content, the attributes of an item described by the 
tag may be distorted or an authorized person may be falsely rejected by the access control 
system. Furthermore, writable tags may become carriers of malware, e.g. data on RFID tag 
can be maliciously modified in such a way that they are interpreted by the system as a 
command. An example of a successful attack of this type is the SQL injection described by 
Rieback et al. (2006). 
In some writable tags, memory content can be protected by temporarily or permanently 
disabling writing capability (‘lock’ and ‘permalock’ functions in standard EPCglobal Class 2 
Gen 2). Malware on RFID tags cannot affect the system if the implementation excludes the 
possibility of interpretation of the tag’s data as a command.  This is similar to switching off 
macros in MS Office which protects the system from running malicious code embedded in 
documents.   
Using sophisticated equipment, like a focused ion beam, it is also possible to change the 
content of memory (EEPROM or ROM) in non-writable tags. This technique can be used to 
set a secret key to a known (zero) value, but it also requires that the location of the key in 
memory is known, expensive equipment, a high level of knowledge and considerable effort. 
In high security applications, measures like protective layers on chips and memory 
scrambling make this kind of attack impractical. 
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2.8 Physical tag destruction 
Physical tag destruction, e.g. by heating in a microwave or hitting with a hammer, is the 
easiest and the cheapest way to disrupt RFID systems. This is a particular issue for 
applications where RFID tags are used not only for identification purposes, but also for the 
protection of items against theft, like in retail or in libraries. RFID tags in e-passports can be 
destroyed by owners who have concerns about possible abuse of their privacy – especially 
as an e-passport with a non-working RFID tag is still valid (Wortham 2007). 
2.9 Blocking and jamming 
Blocking is performed with a ‘blocker’ tag, which simulates the presence of an enormous 
number of tags and causes a denial of service (non-ending interrogation of physically non-
existing tags by the reader). However, blocking may also be a useful mechanism and serve, 
as originally proposed, for the protection of consumer privacy, when a blocker tag protects 
from unwanted scanning (Juels et al. 2003). Another threat to the air interface is jamming, 
which paralyses the communication of an RFID system by generating a radio noise at the 
same frequency as that used by the system.  
Blocker tags and jamming devices are easy to detect and localize immediately after starting 
operation and appropriate warning functionalities can be built into a system.  
2.10 Reverse engineering  
The term ‘reverse engineering’ is usually used for invasive methods of discovering circuit 
structure and even values of voltage at different points of the circuit during its operation. 
The goal is to retrieve the algorithm or the cryptographic key, often with the final purpose of 
copying the tag. This kind of attack requires a high level of knowledge and experience, as 
well as specialized and expensive equipment, like micromanipulators, focused ion beams, 
laser cutters, microscopes and chemical etching equipment.  
The manufacturers of contact smart cards apply a wide variety of measures, which can also 
be used in contactless solutions, although with some limitations resulting from limited 
power supply. Typical measures are: dummy structures which do not have any function 
except to mislead attackers, scramble buses and memory cells, form protective shields on the 
top of chip (especially memory) and encrypt memory content. Active protection is also 
possible: sensors included in the circuit can detect symptoms of attack like change of 
voltage, clock frequency, temperature, etc. - for details, see Chapter 8.2.4 of a monograph 
(Rankl & Effing 2004). Due to resource limitations, RFID-based cards allow only limited 
protection and especially active methods are rather beyond this limit.  
There are also methods of reverse engineering at the logical level, without any physical 
manipulation of the circuit. For example, details of the algorithm used in DST were 
discovered from a general outline which was published, together with observed challenge-
response data for different values of the key, which could be arbitrarily set on blank tokens 
available from the manufacturer.  
2.11 Side channel attacks 
Channel side attacks are based on information gained from physical implementation of 
cryptosystem, like power consumption, time of computations or electromagnetic field (Bar-
El 2003). Power analysis attack is based on the fact that different operations consume different 
power. Analysis of power changes can provide information which, combined with other 
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cryptanalysis methods, can help to recover the secret key. In timing attack, the attacker 
analyses time needed to perform operations. For example, in straightforward 
implementation, PIN comparison is done byte by byte and returns no-match result after the 
first difference. Based on time, it can be deduced which byte caused the rejection of a PIN 
number and a guess can be made, byte by byte. Analysis of the electromagnetic field around 
the chip during its operation is more difficult for RFID than it is for contact chips, because of 
the interference with a stronger field which comes from the communication with the reader. 
However, as shown in (Carluccio at al. 2005), after separation of the antenna from the chip, 
the electromagnetic field generated by operation of the chip can be analysed.  
A basic countermeasure against side channel attacks is to design hardware and software to 
keep power consumption steady and ensure that the time taken by calculations does not 
depend on data or partial results of the operations. This can be achieved by avoiding 
conditional execution of any part of the code, even if the result of the calculation is not going 
to be used. In hardware design, manufacturers can add dummy registers and gates, which 
balance the consumption of energy but, again, resources for this kind of measure are very 
limited. An exhaustive list of references on side channel attacks can be found at 
http://www.crypto.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/en_sclounge.html.   
3. Discussion of selected applications 
In this section, we will discuss the application areas which we found especially important 
and sensitive to privacy and security threats. Our selection is based on several criteria:  
• The importance of the application in terms of economics (market value, number of tags) 
and social impact (number of users, social implications).  
• Security and privacy-related criteria, proposed in (Rotter 2008): 
• Range of deployment of the system 
In systems operating locally within a restricted area, information between readers 
and the backend of the system is exchanged through a local network. Applications 
of this type, like some manufacturing processes or access controls, are generally 
less sensitive to security risks, as the physical security of the place is the first barrier 
to attacks. At the other extreme are global systems, where breaking security gives 
access to the data on millions of tags worldwide, or to a central database.  
• Type of link between an RFID tag and identity-related data 
Privacy risks only exist in systems where it is possible to establish a link between 
the RFID tag and the identity of a person. Systems where it is not possible to link a 
tag to the identity of a person, for example most industrial and livestock tracking 
systems, do not raise any privacy concerns. In item-level tagging for example, or in 
anonymous tickets in public transport, a tag can be temporarily linked to identity. 
In some other applications, this link is fixed and defined in the system – like e-
Passports, payment systems, (e.g. Speedpass) and personal tokens for access 
control. Future applications of this type include credit card systems, location-based 
services and mobile phones equipped with Near Field Communication. Finally, 
systems based on RFID implants are the most privacy-sensitive as the link between 
a person and an RFID tag is physical and not very easy to remove.  
• Demand for security 
Demand for security depends mostly on two factors: a) the size of potential 
damage, in terms of loss of money, loss of customers or, for example, disclosure of 
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privacy-sensitive information, and b) the level of motivation of attackers, related to 
the potential prize they could win if they are successful. These two factors are often 
correlated but not always: for example, in medical information systems, wrong 
treatment may cause serious damage.  In general, however, attacker motivation is 
much lower than it is, say, in payment systems or e-passports.  
In the case of security (not privacy)–demanding applications, we pay more 
attention to the public sector, as we believe that the business sector will more easily 
find a proper balance between expenses for security measures and losses caused by 
insufficient security.  
• Coverage of the most relevant issues related to security and privacy in the set of 
selected applications. 
We do not offer a complete overview of all the application areas where privacy and security 
is relevant - for example, we do not discuss e-payment and access control. However, the 
privacy and security issues in these areas are similar (at least qualitatively) to those related 
to transport or other presented applications.                                                                                                               
3.1 Item-level tagging 
RFID is becoming very popular in logistics and the supply chain (Bose & Pal, 2005), where it 
is employed as a kind of barcode with new, very desirable features. For example, unlike 
printed barcodes, RFID tags do not have to be in line-of-sight to be read, and they enable 
multiple scanning (e.g. the whole truck or basket at once) allowing for further automation in 
many industrial processes. In contrast to a barcode, which replicates an identification 
number only, tags may contain other information e.g. product details or, if combined with 
sensors, the history of storing conditions, mechanical shocks, etc.  
Threats to the privacy and security of users 
Item-level tagging brings privacy threats, which may limit its deployment. RFID tags 
attached to objects people have bought can be interrogated by someone to reveal what items 
they have in their shopping bags (including, for example, medicines) or the prices they paid. 
Moreover, although the set of things a person carries changes, it does not usually change 
completely. Such a set, called the “RFID shadow” or “RFID constellation” of a person 
(Garfinkel et al., 2005), if regularly updated, may serve to effectively track that person. RFID 
tags used for retail cannot be read from more than several meters, even if the standard 
reading distance is extended by a more powerful reader. However, if attackers placed 
readers at the entrances of shops, metros, airports, etc., they would be able to track 
individuals. This possibility has raised concerns for some privacy organizations and 
individuals, like those presented in (Albrecht, McIntyre 2005). 
Moreover, there is a potential risk of physical attack on a specific individual, based on 
his/her automatic identification. In the case of electronic passports some attention has been 
paid to the possibility of constructing a bomb triggered by information received from the 
RFID chip in the e-passport of a specific person or citizen from a specific nation (“American-
sniffing bomb”), see e.g. (Juels et al., 2005). An RFID constellation could be used in a similar 
way and some features of tags used for item-level tagging make them even easier to exploit 
for potential attackers. First, they have a longer standard range, typically 30-70 centimetres, 
compared with 10 cm for the standard 14443A tag used in e-passports. In both cases, the 
standard range can be extended: for e-passports to about 30-40 cm, but for tags used in retail 
considerably further. Second, the e-passport has security protection mechanisms, which 
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make unauthorized identification of the owner more difficult, which are not included in tags 
used in retail. Another concern of some consumers and privacy organizations is ‘function 
creep’, i.e. using a large amount of data obtained by RFID systems for different purposes 
than original ones intended by the system. For example, the data collected by retailers could 
be used for unsolicited targeted advertising, customers could be discriminated against on 
the basis of their purchase history, and the police or intelligence agencies could request the 
data. 
 
Fig. 3. The consumer privacy problem. Privacy concerns around RFID and the vision of 
society under surveillance may significantly influence future deployment of item-level 
tagging. Source: (Juels 2006)  
Concerns about privacy and security are the main reason for low public acceptance of item-
level tagging. Even the big retailers, which for economic reasons are definitely interested in 
quick deployment of RFID, must consider public opinion. Benetton’s plans to attach RFID 
tags to items of clothing caused a boycott of the company’s products, organized by 
CASPIAN3 (http://www.boycottbenetton.com). Protest campaigns have been organized 
against some retailers - for example, WalMart. Undoubtedly, the concerns of consumers and 
their low acceptance of RFID in item-level tagging have slowed down its deployment. 
Another important implication of privacy and security issues for the RFID market is the 
need for the application of technical and legal measures, which make RFID (both single tags 
and whole systems) more complex, and therefore more expensive.  
On the other hand, the demand for security can be seen as a market opportunity. Apart from 
the need for security to be built into RFID systems, we can foresee the demand for personal 
devices which help the user to keep control over the tags he owns. Such devices, for 
example the RFID guardian mentioned in the paragraph on countermeasures, can be 
integrated into mobile phones or PDAs. 
Security threats – the retailers point of view 
Item-level tagging is related to a number of privacy concerns, but there are only a few 
threats related to system security. An attacker who can change the memory content of an 
                                                 
3 Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering 
www.intechopen.com
 Development and Implementation of RFID Technology 
 
248 
RFID tag can modify information about the product. This action could falsify the price of the 
product and this could lead to small fraud or, if maliciously applied on a large scale to all 
products in a supermarket, could cause considerable losses. Writable tags, even those as 
simple as EPCGlobal tags, can be carriers of malware (e.g. SQL injection). Physically 
destroying the tag, or tearing it off the object, is the simplest and the cheapest way to disrupt 
RFID systems. This vulnerability may be exploited when an RFID system is used to protect 
items against theft. Blocking and jamming are threats to the air interface and may result in 
paralysing RFID system communication.  
Generally, the demand for security in item-level systems is not very high and the risk is 
mostly related to material losses on the part of retailers, which are able to apply 
corresponding countermeasures and ensure an adequate level of security at reasonable cost. 
Countermeasures 
The basic security measure against unauthorized reading of RFID tags attached to items is 
deactivation of the tag at the supermarket check-out. A “Kill” command, foreseen in 
EPCGlobal standard (EPCglobal 2004), permanently and irreversibly disables the tag. 
Another method, which gives full control over deactivation to the user, is a design of tag 
which facilitates its easy mechanical destruction by the owner (Karjoth & Moskowitz 2005). 
Unfortunately, deactivation of the tag also disables post-sales services. For example, clothes 
tagged with RFID could automatically set the appropriate programme in a washing 
machine, a refrigerator could be “aware” of its content and report what kind of food should 
be bought (or even make an order on the Internet), and microwaves could prepare food 
according to instructions. If tags are deactivated when products are sold, none of this would 
be possible. A “killed” tag cannot be used if the item is returned to the shop or if the product 
is recalled, which can be essential for some products. For example, a tracking capability 
which facilitates recall in the case of safety defects is one of the main drivers for the 
introduction of RFID in tyres (Garfinkel et al., 2005). Disabling of tags after item purchase 
will also squander the chance to use RFID for automatic segregation of waste and recycling.  
Researchers have therefore proposed several methods which give the user full control over 
the tags in his possession, so it is not necessary to deactivate them. RFID guardian, proposed 
by Rieback et al. (2005), is a device which the user carries with him, possibly embedded in 
mobile phone. It allows tag information to be read only if the user agrees and warns him 
about unauthorized reading attempts. However, this device has not been commercialised as 
yet.   
In addition to technical aspects, legal privacy measures should also be applied.  For 
example, retailers should be obliged to give customers at least the option to deactivate tags, 
and to mark places where RFID readers are operating with special signs.  
3.2 Electronic identity documents 
In order to make the identification of people more resistant to falsification, faster and more 
convenient, there is a need to store the data on identity documents in a form which allows 
automatic reading. Different technologies are used for this purpose, like cards with 
magnetic strips, contact smart cards or even optical memory, like in Italian ID cards. 
Although these technologies are not as convenient as RFID, privacy and security aspects and 
the low acceptance of RFID technology are sufficient arguments against its use. The 
situation is different in the case of electronic passports. The booklet form of the passport 
makes the use of contact solutions difficult. On the other hand, although the air interface of 
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RFID creates potential threats, this technology, due to data processing on chip, allows for 
much more sophisticated and robust security measures than, for example, magnetic or 
optical data storage. RFID-based e-passports have been recently introduced in many 
countries, including all the European Member States. Each e-passport contains personal data 
and a digital photo of the owner. The second generation (introduction in European Union is 
planned for 28 June 2009) will include also fingerprints.  In the future, other biometrics, 
especially iris data, could be added. 
 
 
Fig. 4. The Physical form of an electronic passport is the same as a traditional one. Passports 
with RFID are marked with a sign “ ”on the cover. Source: Bundesdruckerei GmbH 
Privacy and security of electronic passports 
Personal and biometric data are particularly sensitive and the possibility of unauthorized 
access to these data by rogue scanning of passports in owner’s pockets, or eavesdropping at 
border checkpoints, is a major privacy concern. The maximum range for rogue scanning is 
about 30 cm, while for eavesdropping it is at least several meters.4 Another privacy threat is 
people tracking with extended-range readers built, for example, into door frames. 
Identification of the owner of a passport or of an issuing country might lead to the 
construction of a bomb triggered by the proximity of citizens with defined nationalities 
(Juels et al., 2005), see video at: http://pl.youtube.com/watch?v=-XXaqraF7pI.   
                                                 
4 E-passports are based on standard ISO 14443, details on maximum range for scanning are 
discussed in section Rogue scanning. At the Black Hat 2005 Security Conference in Las Vegas, 
NV, a company called Felixis, demonstrated eavesdropping from over 20 m (Thornton et al. 
2006). 
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Countermeasures 
The standard security mechanisms offered by electronic passports is called Basic Access 
Control (BAC). The data printed on the last page of a passport (passport number, expiry 
date, name and date of birth of the owner) are scanned at the checkpoint and, on the basis of 
this data, the 128-bit key is calculated. The size of the key would be sufficient (the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology recommends 112 bit as safe till 2015) but the 
information which serves as a base for key calculation has limited entropy. Moreover, the 
data on the last page of a passport are interrelated, e.g. the passport number is related to 
issue date. As demonstrated in (Hoepman et al., 2006), the total entropy of the key can be 
decreased to merely 41 bits (an example which has been calculated for Dutch passports), 
which is definitely not sufficient.  
Storing fingerprints in e-passports will require stronger security than BAC. As 
recommended by ICAO, fingerprints in European passports will be protected by Extended 
Access Control (EAC), which is based on asymmetric cryptography. EAC includes the 
authentication of both the passport and the reader and limits access to additional biometrics 
(other than face image) to countries which have an agreement with the issuing country, see 
(Gemalto, 2007) for details. Generally, EAC offers strong security but it has some weak 
points: 
• Additional biometrics will be used only to authenticate citizens of “friendly” countries 
(authorized by the issuing country). Border controls, if any, between such countries are 
usually not very strong anyway. Identification of citizens of other countries will not be 
facilitated by additional biometrics.  
• As an e-passport contains a passive chip, it does not have an internal clock and must 
rely on date information received from the reader. Therefore it cannot effectively verify 
if the reader’s certificate is up-to-date. According to the standard, passports should 
keep the date sent by the reader in the most recent authentication, which mitigates the 
problem but does not solve it definitively.  
• Revoking the authorization of a reader to read e-passports is technically impossible. 
This means that a stolen reader will keep its certificate until it expires. Even after this, it 
is possible to use the reader to read passports which had not updated the date after the 
expiry date of the certificate.5  
• As noted by (Hoepman et al., 2006), shallow certificate hierarchy makes it difficult to 
use e-passports for many applications (problems with the management of certificates). 
On the other hand, reserving additional biometrics exclusively for border control 
facilitates user privacy. 
As regards the tracking of people with rogue readers, the attacker would either need to 
break BAC security or use the tag identifiers which are part of the anti-collision protocol. 
The second possibility, discussed in (Hoepman et al., 2006), can be relatively easily 
eliminated by using a random number as an anti-collision identifier. Still, the information 
exchanged between the RFID tag and the reader before authentication allows, in many cases, 
the identification of the issuing country.  
                                                 
5 Additional measures are possible: the certificate does not need to be kept physically on the 
reader but can be sent to the reader though a secure connection when it is needed. It must be 
also noted that a stolen reader would not be sufficient for secret scanning anyway, as BAC is 
additional barrier.  
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At the moment, Basic Access Control seems to be a weak point in e-passport security. The 
introduction of Extended Access Control will not solve this issue, as BAC will remain the 
main way of protecting access to personal data and digital photos. Simple ways of 
increasing the security of BAC, as proposed by Avoine et al. (2008), are: a) the introduction 
of progressive time delay6 when several queries are received in a short period of time and b) 
increasing the entropy of BAC keys by random numbering of passports and by filling in the 
optional (usually not used) field on the last page of a passport with a random number. 
Apart from sophisticated cryptographic measures, shielding seems a simple, effective and 
inexpensive solution. It has already been introduced in the United States: one passport cover 
contains the chip and the other contains anti-skimming material, so the passport cannot be 
read when it is closed. Common introduction of shielding in e-passports would 
substantially increase the level of security. In general, as pointed out in (Snijder, 2007), there 
is a need for an integrated approach to privacy and security for e-passports, harmonized at 
international level. 
Deployment of electronic passports is still in the early stages. They have demonstrated some 
vulnerabilities, which should be improved. On the other hand, it is also important to 
understand the security offered by electronic chips in the broader context (Kefauver, 2007). 
A single instance of the vulnerability of RFID in passports does not necessarily imply the 
vulnerability of the whole system. For example, though data from the chip can be copied 
relatively easily, they cannot be easily modified.  The use of biometrics will therefore ensure 
that a clone will not be very useful for illegal border crossing. RFID and biometrics are 
additions to security measures used before and there is no doubt that the introduction of 
RFID substantially increases overall security. 
3.3 Transport 
The first widespread applications of RFID are related to cars. Remote control devices that 
open/close cars are nothing other than active RFID tags. Immobilizers, a fairly efficient way 
protecting against theft, are RFID passive tags embedded in a key, which communicates 
with the car reader to authenticate a key.  Tags mounted in cars allow automatic collection 
of tolls. The Speedpass System facilitates fast payment at ExxonMobil petrol stations and 
McDonalds in the US (Garfinkel & Rosenberg 2005, chapter 10). 
Contactless smart cards and single-use RFID-based tickets have been used for several years 
in mass transport, making it more efficient and effective. The throughput of passengers 
through metro gates has increased considerably in cities where RFID-based travel cards are 
used. Precise data about travel patterns help to optimize the schedule and number of 
vehicles to increase the system performance. Contactless cards make a big difference to 
convenience for passengers: it is much easier and faster to pass a metro gate or to cancel a 
ticket on a bus, if they do not even need to take the cards out of their wallets. At the end of 
2007, in a trial programme, Oyster cards were built into mobile phones. Introduction of 
RFID creates opportunities for new services, like e-purse, rental of bicycles, and facilitates 
the use of special offers (e.g. holiday tickets). As such systems provide exact information 
about routes taken by each passenger, they enable new payment schemes, like for example 
payment per kilometre. Finally, RFID systems, if properly implemented, can provide high 
reliability and promise a more efficient fight against fraud.  
                                                 
6 With upper bound, to prevent denial-of-service attack 
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Privacy concerns around RFID use in public transport  
Privacy concerns about tracking of people through rogue scanning or eavesdropping in 
proximity of legitimate readers are similar to those which apply to electronic documents. 
Cards used in ticketing have similar range (10 cm with a standard reader) and work on the 
same frequency as e-passports, so we can expect that attackers would have the analogical 
maximum ranges of about 30 cm (theoretically up to 50 cm) for rogue scanning and several 
meters for eavesdropping.  
There are some concerns about data which are legally collected by public transport 
companies. RFID systems provide precise data about each passenger’s travel trajectories, 
which are kept in the system for some time, e.g. 8 weeks in the case of the London system. 
Although these data are considered confidential, the fact of their collection raises consumer 
worries about potential abuse. The Metropolitan Police regularly request journey 
information about Oyster card users.  The information has been used as an investigative tool 
to track movements of criminals; however the rapid increase of the number of queries has 
attracted press attention (7 requests in the whole year 2004, 61 in January 2006 and 243 in 
March 2006). On the other hand, it seems that most users do not mind their travel data being 
collected since the convenience, lower prices and additional services compensate for this. In 
the Oyster system, users can choose between personalized and anonymous cards, which do 
not allow direct assignation of travel trajectories to a passenger name. In practice, many 
more people choose personalized cards, as these provide more services. 
Security issues 
As previously mentioned, the use of proprietary solutions may cause security gaps in the 
system. Nevertheless, due to the limited resources of RFID tags, many companies try to 
develop their own security algorithms, in order to provide security at lower computational 
or memory cost than well known and researched solutions. This was the case of the Digital 
Signature Transponder (DST), used in many immobilizers, for example in Ford and Toyota 
cars and in the Speedpass system. In 2004, researchers from the John Hopkins University 
and RSA Laboratories managed to break DST security. They used a general outline of the 
algorithm published on a website by a Texas Instruments researcher and found out the 
details by reverse engineering.7 Having discovered the algorithm, they were able to break a 
40-bit key in a brute force attack based on two input-output pairs (Juels 2005), see Bono et al. 
(2005) for details.8 The story does not imply that systems which use DST with 40 bit keys are 
entirely unsafe. The challenge-response protocol of tag authentication is only one of several 
layers in car anti-theft protection and in Speedpass security. Moreover, cracking requires 
specialized equipment and knowledge, while most car thieves are opportunists. On the 
other hand, the level of protection is undoubtedly significantly lower than intended by the 
developers. 
Another successful attack against proprietary encryption was reported at the beginning of 
2008. Researchers were able to recover, in an algebraic attack, a 48-bit key used in the 
MiFare Crypto-1 algorithm.  This algorithm has been implemented in about one billion 
RFID tags, mostly in public transport: London Oyster Card, Dutch public transport OV-
                                                 
7 They use so-called blank tags – tags where a secret key is programmable, and analysed 
authentication sequences with different key values. They did not use any invasive methods.  
8 Some photos and videos are available at: http://www.carthiefstoppers.com/About-
RFIDs-and-the-Texas-Intruments-DST.html  
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Chipcard and Boston Charlie Card, and also some access control applications. According to 
preliminary results, published in (Courtois et al., 2008), the attack can take only several 
minutes and can be based on a single eavesdropped transaction. Although the researchers 
published only general information and the details needed for a repetition of the attack were 
not revealed, it is highly probable that they will be discovered and used in a malicious 
attack soon. Public transport systems, built at high cost with the promise of fraud reduction, 
may even increase it. Moreover, the fraud can be more troublesome, as free journeys with 
cloned cards would be charged to the accounts of particular passengers.  
The security issues described in this section apply largely to other application domains, 
especially access control systems and electronic payment. 
Countermeasures 
Cases like DST and MiFare Classic show that security measures applied at the production 
stage may suddenly become insufficient. Unfortunately, if the system based on an insecure 
solution has already been developed, it may be extremely costly to upgrade it, especially if 
the security gaps exist at tag design level. Therefore, special attention should be paid at the 
manufacturing stage in order to avoid errors like: 
• Security gaps in proprietary encryption algorithms. 
• Insufficient key size – this can be long enough while the tag is being designed but, due 
to technological progress, become too short after several years.  
• Insufficient key entropy – for example, a 32-bit nonces used in MiFare Classic has, in 
fact, only a 16-bit entropy, due to a weakness in the pseudo-random generator (Nohl & 
Plötz, 2007). 
If security gaps are reported when the system has been already developed, there are still 
solutions which can help to make it more secure, and avoid the need to immediately replace 
the tags. De Koning Gans et al. (2008) propose the use of strong encryption in the backend 
and the storage of encrypted information only on the tags. In any case, systems should not 
rely only on the security of the tag and it is important to include fraud detection in the 
backend, as has been done in the DST-based Speedpass system.  
In order to ensure privacy a number of privacy-enhancing technologies (PET) can be 
applied, like those proposed by Heydt-Benjamin et al. (2006). However, they make public 
transport systems even more complex and costly, and it seems that, in the near future, the 
main goal of developers will be to reduce costs and decrease organizational complexity by 
providing security at the minimum level necessary, rather than to deploy advanced PET 
methods. 
3.4 RFID implants 
RFID implants are passive tags implanted under the skin, to provide a means of personal 
identification. As they operate without a battery, they can be operational for many years 
once implanted. The use of RFID implants for the identification of people provides some 
advantages compared to established methods. The identification process is practically 
immediate and fully automatic – and therefore extremely convenient: the user is not 
required to take any action. Implants cannot be lost, stolen or forgotten. They are a reliable 
method of identification, especially when compared to biometrics, where due to the 
statistical nature of the matching process, there is always some error probability. Implants 
are more durable than tokens and many types of biometrics, which usually change during a 
person’s life. RFID implants can be used by everyone without exception, including people 
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with cognitive impairment. The user can always be identified, even if he is unconscious or 
not carrying any identity documents. 
Present commercial applications  
In 2004, the first and, until now, the only RFID implant – the VeriChip – obtained approval 
from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The VeriChip implant 
(www.verichipcorp.com), which stores only an identification number, can be read from a 
distance of about 10 cm with a handheld reader and 50 cm with a door reader. The ID 
number is long enough to identify uniquely everybody in the world. Other data related to 
the owner are not stored in the implant, but in a centralized database.  
 
 
Fig. 5. VeriChip implant (original size 3×13 mm). Electronics is encapsulated in bioglass in 
order to make it biocompatible.  
The first commercial application, called VeriMed, is designed to identify patients in 
healthcare. An authorized doctor can access a patient’s medical files through a password-
protected website, using the patient’s ID number which he can get from an RFID reader 
(www.verimedinfo.com). Another commercial application based on the same type of 
implant is VeriGuard – a system for access control to physical spaces like, for example, 
offices. Implants are also used in entertainment: for example, members of the Baja Beach 
Club in Barcelona and a Rotterdam club, who have RFID chips implanted, benefit from a 
quicker VIP service. To date, about 2,000 people have been implanted with VeriChip tags. 
RFID implants can be potentially used in the future for identification and authentication in 
many application areas, either as the only ID technology or in combination with other 
methods – a detailed discussion can be found in (Rotter et al., 2008).  
Security and privacy concerns 
In spite of their high potential, RFID implants raise some serious concerns, largely related to 
security and privacy. The permanent and physical link between an RFID tag and a person 
makes RFID implants more susceptible to privacy risks than any other kind of contactless 
tokens. The user can be identified any time, without his consent or awareness. Here, the 
tracking of people, already a concern in item-level tagging and e-documents, is much easier, 
effective and more difficult to prevent. RFID implants used for authentication are 
particularly vulnerable to coercive attacks, where attackers force authorised users to provide 
their credentials. RFID implants carry the risk of physical harm, as attackers could cause 
injuries by extracting the implants from the victims’ bodies. For this reason, the use of RFID 
implants for secure authentication is questionable, regardless of any technical security 
solutions. It is even argued that implants should not include high security in order to make 
their extraction by an attacker unnecessary (Halamka et al., 2006). However, lack of security 
reduces the reliability of the identification and therefore limits possible areas of application. 
In addition, RFID implants, especially in their current form, are susceptible to cloning and 
replay attacks – for a detailed description of VeriChip cloning, see: http://cq.cx/verichip.pl. 
Security measures for present and future use of implants 
Their lack of an internal power source and the small size of their antennae limit the 
processing power of RFID implants. It is therefore difficult to include advanced 
authentication methods in their design. Currently deployed RFID implants do not include 
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even basic security. The tag, when interrogated, sends back an identification number 
without any type of encryption.  It is, however, possible to include some security measures 
like encryption of the identification number and authentication of the reader. There are 
examples of individuals who have been implanted with RFID tags, which were originally 
manufactured for industry or supply chain purposes, and are equipped with cryptosecurity 
features (Graafstra 2006).  
 
 
Fig. 6. An X-ray of Amal Graafstra’s hand. The chip in the right hand is a Philips HITAG S 
2048 and is equipped with crypto-security. Source: http://www.amal.net/rfid.html  
Implants, even if not equipped with strong security features (authentication protocol), can 
be used as an element of access control systems safely, increasing the security and the 
efficiency of the overall system. Combined in multimodal systems, they protect against 
spying for passwords or against stealing tokens. In systems with authentication based on 
passwords and tokens, implants as an additional modality counteract unauthorized 
delegation of privileges to colleagues. In secure environments, implants could be used for 
continuous detection of presence in the sense that access (e.g. to control boards, or 
computers) is blocked immediately when authorized people leave and then can be re-
established through other, more secure authentication methods. In any case, when strong 
security is required, implants should be used only as an additional means of authentication.  
It is worth noting that security and privacy issues are not the only concerns related to 
implants. Social acceptance of implants is, at the moment, very low. Unclear health 
implications, especially the possible relation between implants and cancer (Lewan, 2007; 
Wustenberg, 2007; Rotter et al., 2008), understandably limit the number of people who 
would like to use them and may even stop their further deployment. 
4. Conclusions 
Concerns about privacy and security may limit the deployment of RFID technology and its 
benefits, therefore it is important they are identified and adequately addressed.  System 
developers and other market actors are aware of the threats and are developing a number of 
countermeasures. RFID systems can never be absolutely secure but effort needs to be made 
to ensure a proper balance between the risks and the costs of countermeasures.  
The approach taken to privacy and security should depend on the application area and the 
context of a specific application. In this chapter, we selected and discussed four application 
areas, but there are many others where privacy and security issues are relevant. In Table 1, 
we list the main threats and the application areas in which they arise.  
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Threats Application areas Main countermeasures 
Rogue scanning of 
confidential data from 
personal documents 
E-documents, e-payment, 
mass transport, access 
control cards, healthcare 
Using short-range tags, shielding, 
authentication of the reader, moving sensitive 
information to a protected database, 
activation of tag by the user 
Rogue scanning of 
data of items carried 
by a person 
Item-level tagging (retail) 
Permanent deactivation (“kill” command), 
RFID privacy management devices like RFID 
guardian 
Eavesdropping of 
confidential data from 
personal documents 
E-documents, e-payment, 
mass transport, access 
control cards, healthcare 
Data encryption, using short-range tags, 
shielding tags with reader during information 
exchange 
Rogue scanning or 
eavesdropping of other 
non-public data 
Logistics, administrative 
process, industry 
Data encryption, using short-range tags, 
shielding, authentication of the reader, 
moving sensitive information to a protected 
database, restricted physical access  
Relay attack 
E-payment, e-documents, 
access control 
Using short-range tags, shielding, distance 
bounding protocols 
Tag cloning and replay 
attack 
E-documents, e-payment, 
mass transport, access 
control cards 
Tag authentication with challenge-response 
protocol, tag design which counters reverse 
engineering 
People tracking 
Item-level tagging, e-
documents, public 
transport, RFID implants, 
e-payment, access control 
cards 
Reader authentication, ‘kill’ command (in 
some applications, mostly retail), random 
identifiers in anti-collision protocol, changing 
pseudonyms, using short-range tags is 
possible, shielding (in some applications) 
Change of tag content 
(e.g. registers value)  
E-payment, transport 
(ticketing), some of 
applications for access 
control, e-documents and 
administrative process   
Limited use of re-writable memory in tags, 
disabling writing feature (“lock” and 
“permlock” commands)  
Physical tag 
destruction 
Item-level tagging (anti-
theft protection), e-
documents (possibility of 
destruction by citizens 
concerned about their 
privacy) 
Adequate physical location of tags on objects 
in retail  
Blocking and jamming 
Applications where 
attacker can benefit from 
denial of service (e.g. 
security-related)  
Facilities for detection and localization of 
jamming devices.  
Reverse engineering 
and side channel 
attacks 
High security applications: 
e-payment, access control, 
e-documents 
Protective layers, dummy structures, memory 
and bus scrambling, encryption of memory 
content; design of the tag which ensures data-
independent time and power consumption  
Table 1. Threats to privacy and security in RFID systems, application areas where they exist 
and the main countermeasures 
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Security and privacy must be considered in the early stages of RFID system development; a 
large part of technical security measures should be taken into account at the stage of tag 
design. Developers should consider not only present but also future levels of risk resulting 
from foreseen improvements in the technology used by attackers. Updating security later is 
very costly, much more so than it is in traditional information systems. Here, when a new 
vulnerability is discovered, it is rarely possible to solve the problem with a software 
upgrade like a security patch. Special attention should be paid to the concept of privacy by 
design (EDPS, 2007). 
 In object-level tagging, the low price of the tag is essential for massive deployment. To keep 
tag costs down, ways may be found by research and development to shift security and 
privacy behind the tag, either to another part of the RFID system (readers-backend) or to 
personal devices for tag management.  
The future will bring further automation. The ‘Internet of things’ is a vision of a global 
network where not only computers but also billions of items tagged with RFID can 
communicate. This, together with sensor networks where RFID-type communication will 
also play an important role, will become part of a pervasive intelligent environment, called 
Ambient Intelligence (Daskala, Maghiros 2007). If security is not properly elaborated before 
it happens, huge amounts of data continuously collected in such an environment will be 
beyond control. 
There is a need to complement technical security with legal measures and their enforcement, 
and to promote best practices by industry. Technical solutions alone will not be sufficient to 
protect against illegal retention and abuse of personal data or function creep. Moreover, the 
deployment of RFID and its benefits may be limited not only by real threats but also by the 
concerns of potential users, resulting from their lack of awareness. Awareness and trust 
should be created simultaneously with the development of appropriate measures to counter 
real threats.    
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